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Abstract
As organizations confront new information
technologies, they are often forced to implement very
expensive systems on the basis of little information about
the product's benefits and potential ‘fit’ within the
organization.  This research examines the implementation
process of an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system
and shows that implementation cannot be viewed solely in
instrumental terms—that is, organizations do not simply
make structural adjustments to the organization so that
proper fit can be achieved.   Instead, this research
suggests that the activities of selecting and implementing
new technologies at the same time serve to elaborate
existing organizational values.   Theorists have described
such activities as a ‘mythmaking’ process.  In that
context, the ‘new’ ERP system and its implementation
become the medium for (re-)constructing or (re-
)constituting the organization’s values.  A case study of
an implementation at a large public organization is
presented to demonstrate how myth-making served to
construct an ERP system as an ‘ideal system’ and the
legacy system as a ‘dying system.’  The myth functioned
as a vehicle of consensual organizational reality, serving
to align the acquisition of an ERP system with the
organizational value of ‘integration,’ thereby garnering
widespread support for a complex and unknown
technology.
Keywords: Myths, systems implementation, ERP, social
process models
Introduction
The purchase and strategic use of information
systems and technologies by organizations has been
offered as the solution to surviving in the emerging ‘e-
based’ economy by both practitioners and researchers
alike.  Yet, as the media has recently reported, the
promise of new technology has not been realized by many
companies, especially those implementing large scale
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems.  For these
systems, implementation failures are becoming the norm
rather than the exception  (Deutsch 1998, Knorr, 1999;).
Many organizations purchasing new ERP software are
confronted with complex, untried technologies, which
they are forced to evaluate and make very expensive
decisions about potential ‘fit’ and acceptance within the
organization.  The research presented in this paper
investigates the implementation of an ERP system as a
process of myth-making.  These myth-making practices
contribute to ‘aligning’ the ERP software with espoused
organizational values and objectives.  The paper adopts an
interpretive case-study as a means of studying how
implementing a new ERP at the same time served as a
vehicle for elaborating the organization’s values thereby
contributing to its acceptance by organizational members.
Information Systems and Organizations
Many studies of information technology
implementation have been influenced by contingency
theory.  In this view, findings identify structural
alignments which respond in some way to technological
demands.  Researchers adopting this approach concern
themselves with identifying structural arrangements such
that greater efficiency may be achieved.  Structure
delimits responsibilities, control over resources, authority
to make decisions, communication relationships, and
other matters thereby providing organizations with
boundaries within which efficiency may be a reasonable
expectation (Thomson, 1967).  Traditionally, this
perspective has influenced studies examining information
technology and organizations (Huber, 1984; Pfeffer and
Leblebici, 1977; Robey, 1977,  Robey, 1981).  While
studies of technological innovations have yielded
interesting results, judging from the number of continued
failures (Jenkins, 1984; Sauer, 1993) technology
implementation continues to be an issue of considerable
concern for practitioners and researchers alike.
Generally speaking, this theoretical orientation
carries an implicit managerial bias toward rationality and
efficiency thereby, imposing limits on the explanatory
ability of studies conducted from this vantage point.
Rationality means that goals are selected, effectiveness
criteria are established, and managers adopt strategies to
achieve identified outcomes to benefit the organization.
Moreover, technology and people are factors to be
optimized.  Excluded are the influences of a range of
cultural, political --in a word social1-- considerations
which are seen as distraction or complication in what
would otherwise have been straightforward technical
                                                
1 Social is defined as the general ways in which groups
are organized (such as gender, network, or occupation) as
well as the practices and interactions among people and/or
groups as they negotiate their way through settings (their
actions, strategies, roles, interests and language).
Through and by these social interactions, people produce
common frameworks of meaning and understanding.
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problems.  Instead, social issues are relegated to the status
of explanatory fixes, as secondary ‘patches’ only after
technical explanations have somehow failed.
Additionally, the idea that people are social agents
actively involved in constructing their work environments
(Myers, 1995) is not considered.  In other words, very
little is said about the social process in which people,
technology, environment and other elements interact over
time.
This paper contributes to a growing movement
of social process research on information technology
(Newman and Noble, 1990; Newman and Robey, 1992;
Sabherwal and Robey, 1995) often referred to as social
informatics (Kling, 1999).  Researchers in this tradition
examine how contextual elements influence and interact
with information technology in its cultural and
institutional environment.  Following in this tradition, this
paper examines the extent to which actors actions and
language use is influenced and constituted by the wider
institutional and cultural environment (Barley,
1986;Orlikowski, 1992) when involved in an ERP
implementation.   This paper shifts the conventional
rational focus of organization-technology research to a
deeper social context by examining the role of myths.
Myths
The idea of myth, or story, as a symbolic
representation, has begun to take hold in organizational
research.    One theoretical tradition underpinning myth-
making organizational research is derived from the work
of Meyer and Rowan (1977).  Along similar lines, other
theorists have examined the role of stories, or what some
have termed ‘narratives.’  Like myths, stories are
recounted to formulate a collective memory.  Stories
people tell contain all kinds information (Pentland, 1999).
Myths and stories are created and sustained through
language, rituals, ceremonies, and other social practices.
They also function as a mechanism that allows
participants to bring order to what would otherwise be
very ‘messy’ situations (Bruner 1990).  In particular,
when myths are used to order reality, they also ‘explain’
the way in which activities, whose origins may be
symbolic or social, are linked to appropriate technical
objectives (Tolbert, 1988:103).  In other words, myths
function by making the subjective seem objective and the
non-rational appear rational in disordered contexts.
Research has been conducted on organizations and myths
(Boje, Fedor and Roland, 1982; Filby and Willmott, 1988;
Quaid, 1993), stories (Boje 1991,1995; Boyce 1995;
Czamiawska 1997) and information technology in
particular (Brown, 1994; 1998a, 1998b;Hirschheim and
Newman, 1991).
Myth-making and storytelling are particularly
well suited for examining an information technology
implementation.  New systems developments projects
present users with equivocal situations or what some have
termed ‘ill-structured’ environments (Zmud et al. 1993).
In this view, users are required to imagine very unfamiliar
or radically altered organizational environments and in
some form, make sense of this.  In other words, end-users
are presented with ‘messy’ situations which they must
somehow organize in order to make sense of their past
actions and future environment.  For this reason, myths
are particularly valuable as an organizing tool.
This paper argues that ‘myth-making’ activities
will function to produce an information system as an
objective tool whose acquisition will enhance specific
organizational objectives.  These activities serve to
organize the organizational environment and, very
importantly, distance what might otherwise be perceived
as a symbolic action from the social practices that
produced it.  In a sense, myth-making activities link the
acquisition of new, untried and expensive tool with
seemingly ‘objective’ organizational values.  They bring a
sense of order and stability to what would otherwise be a
fairly unknown environment.  Thus, myth-making
activities function as ‘alignment’ mechanisms that allow
the technology to fit to the organizational context.
Research Method
This research was conducted within the
interpretive perspective. Recent research on information
systems implementation has indicated an interpretivist
approach is most appropriate for the study of this
organizational phenomenon (Meyers, 1995).  In an
interpretivist approach, the world is seen as being made
up of words, labels and concepts which humans use to
construct social reality.  Therefore, interpretive research
requires that the researcher be immersed in a stream of
organizational events (Evered and Louis, 1981) in an
inductive attempt to create categories, or in this case
myths, that are revised through the integration of data
from observed experiences and the language use of
organizational participants (Putnam, 1983).  This
generation of ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) resulted in
empirical account which was firmly grounded in theory
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Turner, 1981).
The data collection for this case study began in
January 1996 and lasted through December 1998.  The
data were collected by the researcher through
unstructured and semi-structured interviews with 18
managers, participant observations at 32 implementation
meetings lasting between 1-3 hours each, dozens of
informal conversations, and a survey administered to 213
participants.  Most of the meetings were taped.  The
sampling method employed for the interviews is
described by Marshall and Rossman (1995) as elite
interviewing, “a specialized case of interviewing that
focuses on a particular type of interviewee” (:94)
“considered to be the influential, the prominent, and the
well-informed people in an organization” (:83).  The
survey administered included demographic information
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and open-ended questions asking participants from all
levels of the organization to describe the new information
system and the existing legacy system which was being
replaced.
The interviews and observation provided the
researcher with information to interpret the
implementation process and identify myths that emerged.
After transcribing tapes from the interviews, qualitative
analysis proceeded iteratively.  The researcher was
involved in every iteration allowing her to become
‘intimately familiar’ (Eisenhardt, 1989) with the data.
First, each interview was ‘open-coded’ to identify
overarching myths.  In open coding the researcher
operates without predetermined codes and allows the data
to suggest categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  From
this analysis, several myths emerged for each interview.
Then cross-case analysis was conducted across meetings
and interviews, to identify overlapping myths.  The open-
coding and cross checking produced two overarching
myths.  Within each myth, however, there also emerged
themes that contributed to sustaining that myth.
The survey provided a window into the language
use of participants as well as verification of themes that
emerged in the open-coding of interview data.  And
finally, document analyses provided insight into the
formal representation of the organization.  That is, the
formal documents provided added information on the
organization’s formal vision and values.
The Case Study
The organization chosen for the study is a large
public research university located in the northeastern
United States.  It’s annual budget exceeds $.5 billion.
The university is part of a five-campus system where each
campus has Chancellor as Chief Administrative Officer,
but all report directly to the University President.  At the
time of the fieldwork, the University had recently
acquired a large pool of funds targeted for the purchase of
a new information system, which would be owned and
maintained by the campus.  Previous to this, the campus
received information systems services from an IS
department located in and reporting to the Presidents
office.   The implementation project, which will be called
the CIS (Campus Information System) project, was
directly under the control of the Vice Chancellor (and
CIO) of the University.   The phases of the
implementation covered by this study include initiation,
information requirements analysis, request for proposal
issuance, proposal evaluation, and the purchase of new
ERP system.
The Myth Of A Dying System
The old must be discredited before the new can
be ushered in.  Such was the case at the University.  The
legacy administrative system that had been in use for
approximately eighteen years was delegitimated through
the creation of the myth of a dying system.  There we
several factors that contributed to discrediting of the
legacy system.  Some factors stemmed for events passed
that participants recounted during interviews and
information obtained from organizational documents.  In
this section those event are traced out beginning in the
early 1990s through 1996.
In the late 80s and early 90s microcomputer
based networks proliferated throughout the organization
and with it came a new cadre of technology specialists
with criticisms of the existing mainframe legacy system.
With the growth in access and use of these networks
technologies departments began to hire technical support.
A host of new positions were created and filled that did
not belong to the central IS organization that serviced the
legacy system.  The new technologists organized
committees to address their dissatisfaction with the
mainframe legacy system, on which all the major
departments relied. These committees issued reports that
directly criticized the legacy system and made strong
pleas for a new information system and support
organization that would be owned and controlled by the
campus.  In the Spring of 1996, immediately before the
CIS project was publicly announced, a committee issued
an IT strategic plan.  The committee was composed of
thirty IS specialists representing a broad cross-section of
the campus.  However, no member of the central IS staff
was asked to participate.  The report stated:
Administrative systems … are
characterized today by out-of-date,
unintegrated, labor intensive
applications.  Systems have been
created in a haphazard manner and are
either inaccessible or difficult to use.
(emphasis added)
The discontent with the legacy system was clear.
This report made evident that the new technologists
perceived the legacy system as unintegrated and
inaccessible.  Later, the request for proposals for the new
ERP system also strongly criticized the existing system
using similar language:
A variety of applications… however,
tend to be vertically oriented —
meeting the needs of an individual
department or part of a department but
not facilitating an integrated view of
student services.  (emphasis added).
The story being created here was one of a
dysfunctional legacy system that was no longer viable
because it was neither integrated nor accessible to users.
Later, the desirable technical objectives of the new ERP
would be those of integration and accessibility, created in
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direct contrast to the perceived failures of the legacy
system.
In addition to discrediting the legacy software,
the IS support structure was also the target of criticism.
As one report describes this structural arrangement:
While this administrative structure may
have certain advantages in allowing for
the sharing of certain computer
systems, it also leads to both
cumbersome and lengthy procedures
before any decision or action may be
taken, since any given actions may
have different impact on different
campuses.
These reports contributed to creating a story of
a dying legacy computer system as well as an inefficient
structural arrangement for support of that system.
Existing research suggests that the process of
institutionalizing myths involves both creating and
discarding existing rules and practices (Oliver, 1992)
Certain pressures contribute to creating a context in
which existing practice may erode, destabilize or
altogether disappear.  In the case of the University,
particular organizational actors launched attacks directly
on the competing or contradicting institutional practices.
Both the legacy system and its support staff were being
discredited through the conversations that took place at
meetings and the reports that were issued by committees
over the course of six years.  These actions rendered the
legacy system as an illegitimate practice in need of a
solution and created the myth of a dying system. The
rejection of old institutional practice -- of using the
existing legacy systemcould itself be seen as a
necessary ritual before the creation of a new rationalized
myth could take place.
Attacks continued on other levels.  Increasingly,
‘mainframe’ was considered a source of ridicule while
PC, and later client-server, a source of admiration.  As
one manager recounted about an earlier RFP meeting:
these meetings were more about
proving that mainframe technology
was outdated and PC was in, than it
was about evaluating new financial
software.
There were other stories about these
confrontations.  Managers described meetings between
the ‘mainframe people’ and ‘PC staff’ or later called
‘client-server staff.’  The mainframe people were
ridiculed as though they were anachronisms awaiting
death.  On the other hand, client-server was talked about
as the future of technology.  Yet, when asked, these same
managers could not in any substantive way articulate what
if any differences existed between one form of technology
or the other.  However, the story was still believed and
reproduced by managers during conversations and
interviews.  Clearly, the death of one practice was
contrasted with the possible birth of a new practice.
The Myth of an Ideal System
In this section the paper examines how particular
activities created and reinforced the story of a new and
ideal, or ‘better’ system, through attributing to it the
characteristic of integrated.  Myth-making activities
throughout the entire decision and implementation
process centered on this theme.  This myth functioned to
shape acceptance of  the decision and garner
overwhelming support .  Moreover, the implementation
process would also serve to align the new ERP with
formal organizational values.
The theme of integration was a very dominant
one throughout the implementation process.  This theme
was constantly reinforced by the project team, the
consultants hired by the University, the CIO and
Chancellor.  In preparation for the kickoff meeting for the
CIS project, one member of the project team described the
objectives of the new system as, among other things,
“integration..flexible tunable system…allow for
department control”
For public meetings presentations were carefully
crafted.  For example, the project team and consultants
developed an overarching script for the performances of
all of those who would be speaking at the kickoff
meetings.  At the first kickoff meeting the project sponsor
began by attacking the existing IS legacy system and the
support structure.  “We outsource computing services [to
the IS central office] but have no control over how they
do it.  Money is simply taken off the top for services.”
The CIO then described the ideal system,  “in the past
people had to work in silos…we were forced to think
vertically, now we are asking people to think and work
horizontally…in interactive and interdependent ways.”
According to the CIO, the new system would allow them
to work in an integrated environment.  She promised
resources to transition into this new way of working.  The
story of an ideal system was sustained through the
continued reinforcement of integration.  The myth of the
dying system was sustained by the idea that the old
system was unintegrated, whereas, the ideal system was
placed in contrast to this by attributing to it the
characteristic of integrated.
More importantly, the theme of integration was
also a formal organizational value that was at the same
time strongly promoted by the upper level executives of
the organization.  Integration was not a theme that had
been created by the project team for the CIS project, it
was a theme that the Chancellor used in many of his
public appearances and formal documents prior to the
initiation of the CIS project. For instance, in his strategic
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plan published before the initiation of the CIS project, he
states that the campus
will strive to achieve the greatest human
potential among its students, faculty,
staff and alumni, and through them and
its integrative programs…The
University will continue its historic
commitment to removing barriers…The
University will be integrative in all that
it strives to do.
The document suggests integration for a variety
of academic programs and projects, on the
campus.  Integration, as expressed by the
Chancellor in his plan, evoked images of
unification, cohesion, and collaboration.
Throughout his public performances, such as
faculty senate or board of trustees meetings, the
Chancellor continually reinforced the value of
integration.
What we can see here is that in fact,
integration was perhaps as much a symbol of the
ideal state for the campus community as it was a
description of the ideal system.  Creating the
myth of an integrated system and integrated
campus worked to produce a close alignment
between the technology and the organization.
This close coupling is evidenced in the request
for bids issued for the purchase of the ERP.
According to this document, an integrated
system was one that “must be integrated with its
environment as well; it can not be an isolated
system, but one which much exist in the broader
administrative, academic, and cultural setting of
both the campus and the university system.”  The
‘fit’ of the technology to the organization seems
to be an appropriate one.
However, the myth-making also
allowed members to elaborate and re-constitute
the organizational value of integration.  The
rhetoric of organizational change was one of
transforming the organization from fragmented
to integrated, whereas the CIS project was to
transform the information environment from a
fragmented to an integrated one.  Through the
constant reinforcement of the attribute of
integration the myth of an ideal (and integrated)
system took shape.  This myth functioned as a
vehicle of consensual organizational thought,
serving to align the implementation team’s
various activities with the organization’s values,
but at the seam time re-constitute them.
Moreover, the implementation process, as myth-
making activity, served to align the technology
purchase with formal organizational goals.
In order for myth to be believed, the myth must
be shared and sustained by individuals.  In this view,
language is key in the creation and maintenance of a
myth.  This study examined the language use of
participants involved in the CIS project.  A survey was
administered to 213 participants at all levels of the
organization.  At the time the survey was administered,
the ERP was not yet in production.  The response rate was
42.4 percent, providing a sample of 86 surveys.  In
responding to the question of level of support for the
decision to purchase and install an ERP (7 point Likert
scale), findings show that there was overwhelming
support.  97.7 percent either somewhat agreed, agreed or
strongly agreed.  An open-ended question asked
respondents to describe the legacy system and the new
ERP system.  After reading and coding all questions the
following categories and frequencies listed in Table 1
were obtained:
Table 1. Survey Responses to Open-Ended Question


















Campus-owned and operated 2.3%
The responses are revealing of just how
successful the project team, consultants, and CIO had
been in creating the myth of ideal system that would be
integrated and also accessible.  In open-ended questions
respondents used language that indicated that 46.5 percent
believed the new system was either an integrated system
or would allow for integration and 24.4 percent believed it
to be accessible.  Yet, only 13.4 percent of those
responding had actually used the new system.  That is,
only a select group of individual were now in the testing
phase and had actually any information by which to judge
whether the new ERP system was either integrated or not.
However, the performances by CIS supporters rendered
the ERP as an objective tool with integration ability
thereby, distancing it from the social practices that
produced it as such.  Additionally, 54.7 percent of the
respondents stated that they had received most of their
information about the ERP system from co-workers.
These respondents had not attended public performances
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by project team member or the CIO, yet they seemed to
be equally influenced.  This suggests that the myth was
now being reproduced and sustained by others beyond the
more visible supporters of the myth.  The myth of an ideal
system seemed to have taken hold as it was sustained and
recreated by organizational members at all levels of the
organization.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that much of the
organizational literature on technology takes a very
rationalistic and static approach to examining the changes
that must take place for technology to become ‘aligned’
with the organization.  The research presented here
provided a framework that punctuated the importance of
social context as a key influence in the technological
implementation process.  Specifically, this paper argued
that technology cannot be considered in isolation from the
social practices which produce it.  Put another way,
information technology must be understood as dependent
on a variety of complex social processes and cultural
conventions, all of which render it a ‘knowable’ entity.
Through the study of an implementation, this paper
highlighted the crucial importance of myth-making as the
vehicle by which technological attributes are rendered
‘real’ and come to positively influence an
implementation.  Moreover, this story-making process
served to align the technology with ideal organization
values.
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